that many of the five hundred manuscripts he received for Comparative studies in society and history, during his term as editor, concerned colonial matters: "The colonial experience offers a degree of analytic control not usually available to social scientists; new influences and pressures can be identified and their assimilation, distortion, or rejection can be traced." 13 Grew's comments point to the importance of a longstanding international project to compare the history of India with the history of Indonesia, animated by the Centre for the History of European Expansion at the Rijksuniversiteit Leiden under the watchful eye of, among other scholars, H. L. Wesseling, C. A. Bayly, D. H. A. Kolff, P. C. Emmer, and Leonard Blussé.
14 Science is not a principal focus for the scholars at Leiden, although in the course of their collective endeavour it has proved impossible to neglect natural knowledge. Michael Adas, a United States historian with ties to Leiden who has written about impressions of modernity in modern empires, keeps science at arms' length. 15 Commenting on a series of recent essays dealing with Manchu colonialism, Adas avoids addressing conceptions of the natural world -even though one of the essays under consideration, concerned precisely with maps of North-Central and East Asia, fairly cries out for a comparative discussion of surveying command structures, measuring techniques, and printing practices. 16 The Leiden group did publish a brilliant comparative collection in 1991 with the Japan-Netherlands Institute in Tokyo as the third volume of the Institute's Journal, edited by W. G. J. Remmelink, which records the proceedings of a conference on the transfer of modern science between Europe and Asia. Many of the thirteen chapters radiate wide learning, but only two are explicitly comparative. H. Floris Cohen concludes in his contribution: "To distant China's science the West does not seem to owe much -partly because of the 'translation filter', partly as a result of the incommensurability of the natural philosophies of China and the West"; Harm Beukers reaches a related conclusion that, in early modern times, there was relatively little interchange of medical knowledge East and West, except for the Western use of Eastern medicinal herbs, and with recognition of the special case of Japan. 17 These promising explorations have remained within a relatively small community of scholars. Because historians of science still overwhelmingly study European and North American occurrences, they have paid little attention to innovations emanating from Leiden and elsewhere which deal with European expansion. History of science seems to follow the observations of the Sinologist Craig Clunas, who emphasizes, in reviewing a history of Western consumers: "Comparative work is all very well, but, with certain shining exceptions, it tends for the present to take place toward the periphery, not at the center, of the historical field." 18 Philosophers have analysed science from first principles, and even Thomas Kuhn in his last writings sought to follow this path, but understanding also arrives through examination of many concrete examples taken from the natural world. Some knowledge -religious or artistic -may come directly from divine inspiration, but an apprehension of the world in the undertaking called natural knowledge is won through a process of sorting things out into kinds. The disturbing sabotage of this view opens Michel Foucault's book, Les mots et les choses, where Foucault recounts Jorge Luis Borges's description of the animal kingdom in a medieval Chinese bestiary, organized in an apparently fabulous and nonsensical fashion. 19 Foucault, whose methodological animadversions seem guided by anarchist impulse, nevertheless places things in diverse heaps. 20 If generalization is granted to historians (the matter is contested), it comes following sustained reflection of comparable instance and example.
Notwithstanding the underground status of comparative history generally, the following pages contend that comparison has been a persistent feature of the discipline of history of science. Comparative studies have been among the most innovative and the most durable of scholarly undertakings in our field, and they have been carried out from a number of locations around the world. They have generated significant discussion, and they have stimulated new areas of inquiry. At the present time, when postmodernism has run its course and when scholars are looking to formulations based on constructive labour and clear prose, comparative history of science offers direction and inspiration. The very range and richness of what has appeared over the past generation, especially, recommend comparison as a solid foundation for research in the present decade. 21 A particular merit of comparison derives from its ecumenical presence in the world of scholarship. Persuasive and original studies have issued from Cambridge and Berkeley, as well as from São Paulo and Tokyo, from the hand of doctoral students as well as distinguished professors. Today the application of comparison harbours no eponymous "school", whether deriving from a university town or a philosopher. It displays neither secret agenda nor code words, and it is intolerant of muddle-headed prose. By its nature, it resists appropriation by bonzes or Gelehrter. Comparative history of science may provide a path to scholarly reconciliation in a fissiparous discipline.
* * *
Comparison is implicit in nineteenth-century historical studies, which not infrequently sought to establish contrasting racial or regional styles. In the New World, comparison appeared explicitly in the two great commentators on democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville and Henry Adams, and in Domingo Faustino Sarmiento's novel about civilization and barbarism, Facundo. The French polymath Pierre Duhem contrasted British model-building to French mathematical abstraction. 23 In his history of European science, the Anglo-German wonder John Theodore Merz characterized the ideal type of German scientist by an attention to thoroughness, an awareness of the larger picture, a desire to create acolytes, and a predilection to deal with philosophy; English scientists were idiosyncratic and practical-minded; French scientists were analytical and pedagogical. This interpretive device has proved remarkably resilient. 24 The Swiss naturalist Alphonse de Candolle, in his work on foreign memberships in national academies, was explicitly comparative. 25 Johannes Paulmann recently suggested that historical comparison is most effective on a European scale, where on occasion science is present. 26 The origin of this restriction lies in the faint presence of Western historical inquiry beyond the North Atlantic World. The asymmetry is acute: there are many treatments of Argentina and Indonesia by North Atlantic scholars, but very few in the reverse direction. A sense of the poverty may be obtained from a collection edited by Ivan Vallier in 1971, where a Eurocentric focus, from Karl Marx to Talcott Parsons, weighs heavily in the historical footnotes -in clear contrast to the extra-European discussion of anthropology. 27 When reason and enlightenment come into play, Europe still takes centre-stage. Indeed, in his comparative social history of the Enlightenment, Thomas Munck portrays Benjamin Franklin only as a kite-flying, masonic, American politician, rather than, more optimistically, a printer, diplomat, and American natural philosopher. Munck asserts: "Natural philosophy remained throughout the eighteenth century primarily in the hands of non-specialists", apparently mistaking physics for philosophy dealing with "basic scientific methodology". 28 Robert H. Robins has traced the early development of the discipline from which comparative history derives. The inspiration for disciplined comparison comes from the enterprise of comparative linguistics. Appearing explicitly in the Renaissance through the work of scholars like Joseph Justus Scaliger, comparison of languages proceeded under the watchful eye of Leibniz, mindful of the practical translations upon which European expansion was predicated. Then, late in the eighteenth century, the field exploded with the labors of Sir William Jones, Jacob Grimm, Rasmus Rask, Franz Bopp, and Alexander von Humboldt, whose book, Die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues appeared posthumously in 1836. 29 The notion behind comparative linguistics was simple: by comparing existing languages and thereby reconstructing extinct antecedents, it would be possible to extend historical reasoning back to a time before written documents.
Anthropology provided a second scholarly focus for comparison in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and, inspired by Auguste Comte's writings, it led into ambitious programs for analysing the evolution of civilization. Franz Boas and Alfred Lewis Kroeber, for example, wrestled with comparison throughout their career, and anthropologists still provide many of the most interesting comparative studies with relevance to historical themes, for example, Tadataka Igarashi's study of astronomy in the Malay Archipelago. 30 The centre of comparative history at the University of Wisconsin owes a great deal to anthropological inspiration. 31 Roland Axtmann has observed that the nineteenth-century comparatists, whether anthropological or sociological, were evolutionist; they sought to classify cultures and societies and aimed "towards assigning cultural traits (or whole countries) to a specific stage of development". The comparative method "allowed investigators to see social and cultural differences as simply representing various stages of evolution". 32 The lines between anthropology, sociology, and history have been blurred for more than a century (a notable early example is found in the writings of Pitirim Sorokin), despite the caution against such mésalliance in the controversy around Karl Lamprecht.
Fritz Ringer observed a generation ago that Lamprecht was at the centre of a controversy that became known as the Methodenstreit, the struggle over method. In the 1890s, Lamprecht, ordinarius of history at Leipzig, was publishing a multivolume history of Germany which had a wide readership. Borrowing eclectically and carelessly from political historians, economic historians, and psychologists, Lamprecht enlisted a "rather turbulent mixture of anthropological information, imaginative portraiture, and embarrassingly superfluous rhetoric about psychosocial laws" to describe cultural epochs in terms of fundamental psychological resonances. Lamprecht's writings generated intensely negative feelings in the German historical community, for whom the aim of history remained the elaboration of decisive individual action in the development of the state. There was, however, no general agreement about Lamprecht's basic orientation, whether he was, indeed, idealist, materialist, or positivist. The Lamprecht controversy, Ringer concludes, "helped make German historians acutely conscious about their methods during the late 1890s and thereafter". 33 Cultural history and its comparative focus fell into disrepute in Germany, but they enjoyed a rebirth in France during the late 1920s through the School of the Annales, founded by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch. To Marc Bloch falls the distinction of proposing a method for comparative history.
Elaborating remarks by Henri Pirenne, Bloch described comparative history as the process of identifying two or more phenomena that seem analogous and that appear in one or more social settings, and then considering how these phenomena resemble and differ from each other. A historical comparison required similarity between the observed phenomena as well as "a certain dissimilarity between the environments in which they occur". Bloch noted that there are two different ways of applying the comparative method. One may consider societies widely separated in space or time, like those in Sir James Fraser's Golden Bough, or one may take as unites of comparison societies that are geographical neighbours or historical contemporaries, as in the method of comparative linguistics. In either case, the comparative method helps the informed historian formulate questions to ask the documents that he confronts. The comparative approach allows the historian to discover phenomena that a first glance seem to be lacking in one geographical area or society. The comparative method can illuminate divergent evolution, when a phenomenon becomes extinct in one place but persists in another. It is sometimes indispensable in the search for historical causes. 34 The program of the Annaliens brought them to study long-term economic trends, which eventually took them into the terrain of science and technology. 35 Two critics have identified a restriction that in their view is fundamental to Bloch's program: "What ought to be compared in any study that claims to follow the method used in comparative historical linguistics is all and only the phenomena in a related group." 36 That is, just as the construction of Proto-Romance requires studying all living descendants of this extinct language, so understanding the origins of feudalism requires an analysis of all its later, medieval manifestations.
Comparative history has gone beyond Bloch's prescriptions. Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers identify three different kinds of comparative history: macro-causal analysis, which resembles multivariate hypothesis-testing; the parallel demonstration of theory; and the contrast of contexts. 37 Charles Tilly, after examining the state of global, historical comparison, divides scholarship into four categories: individualizing comparisons, universalizing comparisons, variation-finding comparisons, and encompassing comparisons. In general, he notes, "Historically grounded huge comparisons of big structures and large processes help establish what must be explained, attach the possible explanations to their context in time and space, and sometimes actually improve our understanding of those structures and processes". 38 A. A. van den Braembussche points to the value of comparison operating in three "mixed" forms which he calls generalizing (where differences between instances move to centre-stage), macrocausal (hypothesistesting), and inclusive (where the instances to be studied are found within one large context, for example, a world economy). 39 Maurice Mandelbaum classifies comparative history into the evolutionary approach (for example, the sociology of Auguste Comte), the genetic approach (tracing similarities among societies through their lines of descent), and the analogical approach (further divided into a phenomenological form of carrying out direct description and an analytical form of identifying implicit resemblances). 40 A sense of the many moods of comparatists and also of the heavy theoretical machinery invoked to put a compass to them may be obtained from a forum on comparative historiography at the second European Social Science History Conference in 1998. 41 Levels of theory cascade one upon the other in Jörn Rüsen's discussion of comparative historiography. 42 By way of temperamental and literary contrast, Robert Darnton, an historian working with primary sources, has offered a practical agenda for a comparative history of the book. 43 An understanding of comparison certainly differs from one historian to another, but nearly all writers would agree with Christophe Charle, in his comparative study of intellectuals in the nineteenth century, that the merit of comparison is not to confirm propositions that are in essence tautological, of the kind: "French intellectuals behave in a certain way because they are French." 44 The Dreimännerarbeit, or three-man work, followed the major archival project of the 1960s, Sources for the History of Quantum Physics, led by Thomas S. Kuhn and conducted with the help of Heilbron and Forman. 57 The Sources project sought to assemble letters from and interviews with the major actors in the revolution of twentieth-century physics. The project led to the extraordinary resources available today through the Center for the History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics. The material allowed Kuhn, Heilbron and Forman to produce remarkable works of scholarship, notably Kuhn and Heilbron's tracing of Niels Bohr's path to his atomic model and Forman's thesis that the reception of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle in Germany was a response by physicists to a cultural environment that was hostile to traditional reason and causality. 58 Forman in fact elaborated the contrast between Germany and England in this regard. 59 Stimulated in part by the work of the Institute for Scientific Information in Philadelphia and its Science citation index, in part by the indefatigable optimism of scholars like Price, quantitative analysis was on the agenda for historians of science in the 1970s. 60 Forman, Heilbron and Weart set out to provide a comparative, statistical picture of physics at academic establishments around the world in the year 1900, the eve of the quantum revolution. They compared physical size, budget, and staff of laboratories and institutes, as well as the literature output of national sectors. The information was assembled from a wide variety of published sources, and it appealed to the extensive archival record. They concluded that Germany dominated physics, although the United States was rising rapidly in the discipline; France was declining. The study is remarkable for having resolved many issues that confound comparison, for example, fluctuating currency exchanges and distinctive command structures. Other persuasive comparisons on related material have appeared, but the Dreimännerarbeit remains unique in scale and sophistication. 61 Complementing the master-work of Forman, Heilbron and Weart were other significant comparative studies in the 1970s. Jack B. Morrell provided a paradigmatic study comparing the success of Liebig's school of organic chemistry in Germany and the relative eclipse of Thomas Thomson's chemical school in Scotland, a form of institutional comparison that continues to generate fruitful results. 62 Loren Graham studied how eugenics came to Germany and Russia in the 1920s. 63 John Heilbron presented a comparative picture of physicists in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Europe in his definitive early history of electricity. 64 Comparison continued into the 1980s with major, new statements by David Landes on clocks and clockmaking, Daniel J. Kevles on eugenics in Great Britain and the United States, and Thomas P. Hughes on large networks of electrical power in Europe and America. 65 In Hughes's nuanced study, he shows that there was no inevitability to the development of electrical power, for technological choices (such as direct versus alternating current) abounded; the architecture of networks derived from social, not technological, imperatives; that technologists sought to resolve thorny problems, rather than remand them to scientists; that electrical power came as part of a vertical integration of banks and factories; and that when established, technology acquires a 'momentum' of its own, which shapes and constrains many social enterprises. 66 In the 1980s, generalizations emerged based on extensive comparison, notably Gerald L. Geison's classification of specialties and research schools. 67 68 Jonathan Harwood compared genetics in Germany and the United States, and Erik Baark, Andrew Jamison and their colleagues at the University of Lund examined national styles of administration of science and technology. 69 In his doctoral dissertation at Johns Hopkins University, Louis Barry Rosenblatt compared early Victorian geology with early Victorian classical history. 70 Two enterprises based extensively on both primary and secondary sources merit special attention. Jens Høyrup undertook to reformulate the social conditions for mathematics in Antiquity and the medieval period, an enterprise complementing the technical analyses of Otto Neugebauer's school and in any case appealing to a good number of ancient and modern languages. His approach was modest. He sought to investigate how the character of mathematical thinking depends on the institutional situation in which mathematics is practiced as knowledgeperhaps as theory, perhaps as techniques one should know in order to apply them -in interplay with the wider cultural settings and societal determinants of institutions. The method is cross-culturally and cross-historically comparative, but no effort is made to find the same parameters in all cases, apart from the choice of teaching as a critical factor.... Nor do I, indeed, believe that a schematization aiming at finding a rigid common grid of explanatory factors makes much sense in cultures as widely divergent as those dealt with here. 71 For the modern period, Susan Sheets-Pyenson undertook a pioneering comparative study of popular-science publications in London and Paris during the middle of the nineteenth century, concluding that French science popularizers were "high-science watchers" while English science popularizers were "high-science boosters". The French popularizers reported passively on academy and laboratory, while the English amateur scientist could and did contribute to academic science. 72 She then published a landmark study comparing nineteenth-century natural-history museums in Argentina, Australia and New Zealand, and Canada. Sheets-Pyenson's approach was an integrating one, in the manner of social historians. Her book on colonial natural-history museums avoids superfluous appeal to methodology. The five institutions considered in her book constitute type specimens of the "colonial museum". She writes: "The patterns of development drawn from the five cases ... are typical of the more successful among colonial museums." Generalizations are omnipresent, whether on matters of personnel, funding, or institutional organization, and they are presented inobtrusively to draw the reader in; just as with Høyrup's study, absent is rhetoric about abstract constructions such a role-set, ideology, and power, of the kind displayed in sociology of science. 73 As Sheets-Pyenson's work demonstrates, in addition to encouraging a certain economy of explanation, comparison discourages triumphal writing, for in any historical comparison, even the most successful example carries less than desirable traits. (Otto Neugebauer remarked, for example, that while Babylonian science was clearly more sophisticated than Egyptian science, he would certainly have preferred to live in Egypt over Babylon.) Comparison cautions enthusiasm. Early in the 1980s, Joseph Needham published his Ch'ien Mu Lectures at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The book is an accessible meditation on science East and West, continually comparing figures, inventions, and understandings. To cite one of a very great many examples, Needham holds that "the centralised feudal bureaucratic style of social order was in the early stages favourable to the growth of applied science". This social order, controlled by the shih, or scholar-bureaucratic meritocracy, departed from the "aristocratic military" feudalism of the West, and it permitted grand enterprises like the "Big Science" of the twentieth century:
Chinese society in the Middle Ages was able to mount much greater expeditions and much more organised scientific field work than was the case in any other society of that time. A good example of this is the survey of the meridian arc carried out early in the +8th century under the auspices of I-Hsing ... and the astronomer Nankung Yüeh. This was a geodetic survey covering a line no less than 2500 km long, ranging from Indo-China to the borders of Mongolia. At about the same time an expedition was sent down to the East Indies for the purpose of surveying the constellations of the southern hemisphere within 20° of the south celestial pole.
He reviews the complex development of gunpowder, concluding: "While gunpowder blew up Western military aristocratic feudalism, the basic structure of Chinese bureaucratic feudalism after five centuries or so of gunpowder weapons remained just about the same as it had been before the invention had taken place." He reconsiders the origin of Islamic alchemy, observing Chinese antecedents in macrobiotics and the invention of automata. Needham concludes: "Arabic alchemical theory was a marriage between the Taoist idea of longevity or immortality, brought about by the ingestion of chemical substances, and the Galenic rating of pharmaceutical potency, in accordance with the krasis, the mizaj, and 'adal -the balance of the four primary qualities, the natures." The attempt of Jabir ibn Hayyan to create life in an alembic is the union of Chinese medicinal alchemy and Greek metallurgical chemistry, and "If nothing living was really ever seen to step forth from Jabir ibn Hayyan's cosmic incubators, chemotherapy with all its marvellous achievement of today was certainly born from the Chinese-Arabic tradition with Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Paracelsus Bombastus von Hohenheim as its great midwife". And it was neither William Harvey nor the Damascus physician of the thirteenth century, Ibn al-Qarashi al-Nafis, who originated the circulation of the blood: it was the Chinese, although to Harvey fell the notion of the heart as a pump.
Needham's eye for detail did not prevent him from issuing broad generalization. The preceding extracts suggest the extent to which his project is animated by a comparative urge. 74 Needham's comparison finds an extension in other syntheses. Shigeru Nakayama, in a comparative work first appearing in Japanese in 1974, proposes that East Asian knowledge derived from documentary scholarship, while Mediterranean knowledge stemmed from rhetorical learning, and he examines why, "among the multitude of theories and arguments afloat in classical Greece and Warring States China, those of Aristotle and Confucius assumed the paradigmatic mantle". Aristotle and Confucius achieved the status of an authority in part as a result of a tradition of "manuscript-centered, classics-oriented scholarship". The tradition, which in each case lasted more than 1500 years, required an originator of some sort: "The question of authorship was not a significant issue. The name of the progenitor and the texts associated with him were used first of all as an invisible yet commonly understood badge of identity by which scholars knew themselves and were known to others." Nakayama's text is unusually rich in its comparative style; that is, comparative discussion often occupies many consecutive paragraphs, for example, distinguishing the classificatory mode of Chinese science, which easily accommodates Kuhnian anomalies, from the Western science of unitary, nomological explanation, which eventually breaks under the weight of growing numbers of anomaly. 75 Toby E. Huff has reconsidered science from the perspective of the social philosopher Benjamin Nelson and through the impetus of Joseph Needham. "Without doubt", Huff writes, "Joseph Needham's monumental study, Science and civilisation in China, did more than any other work in the twentieth century to draw attention to the need for a comparative, historical, and sociological study of the rise of modern science". Huff's appeals to sociology detract from a comparative inquiry that may stand on its own merits. One of Huff's original contributions is to identify the special character of law in European, Islamic, and Chinese civilization, and to contend that only European legal tradition, both conceptual and institutional, paved the way for the formulation of natural laws in modern science: "By the end of the thirteenth century, along with the formal elements of the Aristotelian corpus, a powerful, methodological sophisticated, intellectual framework for the study of nature had been institutionalized" in European universities. For Huff, universities, far from being bastions of ignorance and prejudice, were the engine of the Scientific Revolution:
Sociological and historical accounts of the role of the university as an institutional locus for science and as an incubator of scientific thought and argument have been vastly understated.... The universities were highly instrumental in disseminating many new intellectual currents in scientific thought, and, most important of all, they were the primary locations of severe criticism of both old and new ideas. 76 Edgar Zilsel's fruitful emphasis on artisans and craftsmen as the non-academic builders and measurers of the world recedes in favour of a focus on the traditionally maligned schoolmen as disseminators of the new knowledge. 77 Sophisticated comparison is now a structural feature of scholarship dealing with East Asia. The Seventh International Conference on the History of Science in East Asia, held in Kyoto in 1993, produced a number of sensitive studies in this direction. There Nathan Sivin outlined a program to delve more deeply into comparing ancient Greek and Chinese science. Comparisons have accumulated "a certain number of facts and dates ... but the conclusions drawn in the many published comparisons seldom affect our daily work or our understanding of the world we study", that is, the details of East Asian science. Sivin offered that many comparisons were made "out of context one at a time, whether they are concepts, values, machines, or groups of people". He presented a project undertaken with G. E. R. Lloyd to focus on the period 300 B.C. to A.D. 200 in both the Greek and Chinese ambit. Sivin's preliminary conclusions identify a Greek culture of disputation and a Chinese culture of consensus; the Chinese notion of 'polis' was unifying and centralized, while in Greek learning there was a multiplicity of political concepts; Chinese rulers established a loyal civil service and they were disposed to acknowledge political limitations offered by their clercs, while Greek rulers and their successors ignored the advice of philosophers, a situation that encouraged heterodoxy; Greek learning was a competitive affair, functioning by oral disputation, while Chinese scholars offered their thoughts directly to rulers, and in this way sought to avoid disagreement. In the same proceedings, Karine Chemla compared algebraic equations in Babylonian, Greek, and Chinese traditions, identifying two unique features of the Chinese literature: equations were imagined as arithmetical operations, and equations were solved within a framework of root extraction. By philological analysis involving a number of Arabic texts, Chemla posited a debt by Arabic algebra to Chinese tradition. Jianjun Mei and Tsun Ko compared copper, iron, and zinc technology in India and China. Hans Ulrich Vogel compared Chinese and Western accounts of subterranean brine and gas wells. In view of some confused postmodernist rhetoric that the conference sustained, Vogel's conclusion is strikingly reasonable: "Western explanations of the seventeenth century were in no way superior to their Chinese counterparts. Only with the development of modern chemistry and geology towards the end of the eighteenth century were Western scholars in a better position to forward, in the long run, more realistic explanations." Vogel shares Needham's emphasis on the unique importance of the European Scientific Revolution. Rocke has offered a "comparative perspective" on the early nineteenth-century organic analysis of Liebig, Dumas, and Berzelius; the 'comparison' is summarized weakly: "The battles over elemental organic analysis circa 1830 provide an interesting window on wider aspects of chemistry, science, and European culture. Liebig borrowed essential elements of French culture and French chemistry, some of which remained with him for the rest of his life, but he added other elements as well, including German and Berzelian." 79 A fine comparison of two contemporaries has been provided by Russell McCormmach in his study of the response by Albert Einstein and writer Hermann Broch to the horrors of the 1930s and 1940s: "Among the realistically hopeful and humane critics of the actions of politicians and the publics who supported them were a number of scientists and artists who included the physical scientist who was perhaps the most gifted since Newton, and one of the century's greatest writers of fiction -Einstein and Broch." Both men knew, as we know, that the recent barbarism arose "from within, from the core of European civilization" where great works of art were produced and where the great scientific and technical institutes were. The extermination of tens of millions of Europeans by Europeans, to say nothing of the related extermination of and by non-Europeans, in a brief thirty years following 1914 makes the normally reflective person question whether or not science and art have had any significant influence for the better on the political life of the West.
Neither man questioned his own search for meaning and harmony in science and in art, although Broch "did question ... the value of the pure quest for beauty, and he made that question, paradoxically, the heart of his mature artistic work". McCormmach allows that if, today, we are inclined not to take their notions seriously, it is an artifact of the timelessness of ethics: "If their admonitions sound like moral platitudes -so they have been called -it is because the standard of moral judgments is not originality." McCormmach's essay concludes:
Science and art, as Einstein and Broch knew, may not make our character better, but they jointly shape many of our perceptions of reality. Ethical judgements and actions take their starting point both in character and in perceptions of reality. In this sense, both science and art serve as guides through our ethical universe. 80 The assessment gives meaning to our own specialty, which frequently seeks to evaluate the character of reality perceivers.
As part of her extensive work on the Nobel institutes and prizes, Elisabeth Crawford has indicated three ways of undertaking comparison in history of science. The first is to study disciplines, specialties, and schools; the second is to focus on élite stratification of scientists; the third is to divide the world into centre and periphery. Crawford undertakes a prosopography of the group consisting of nominators and nominees for Nobel prizes to explore these three senses of comparison, and she applies her results to evaluate the notion of internationalism in science. Her felicitous choice of data allows her to go beyond impressionistic generalizing. It remains a rare, sophisticated comparative study dealing explicitly with European science. A fourth form of comparison places comparable instances alongside each other, notably in considering the reception of scientific innovations in a national context. 81 Thomas Glick has used the national-reception comparison effectively in a collective volume considering how people responded to Einstein's relativity. The chapters in the volume focus on particular national sectors, and it is left for the reader to propose explanations for differences and similarities. One of the chapters does explicitly engage comparison, considering how the structure of the German response to relativity, called a scientific revolution, compares with the structure of the French Revolution. 82 A related collection considers science separately in the United States and in Australia, although the volume includes a scintillating comparative chapter by Susan Sheets-Pyenson and a comparison of science in Ireland and in Quebec during the nineteenth century by Richard A. Jarrell; a companion volume comparing science in Canada and Australia features only three explicitly comparative chapters in a total of nine, and of the three only one focuses on science. 83 Historians with a theoretical bent have not hesitated to offer prescriptions to their colleagues, but comparison in the history of science, undertaken by theorizing authors, often remains indistinguishable from conflation. The result may be persuasive and original, even if comparison is not a primary desideratum, as in David S. Landes's Unbound Prometheus, but the danger is superficial narrative, or 'potted' history. 84 Colin A. Russell's survey of two centuries of European science appears in a series devoted (according to the editor's foreword) to themes "in a comparative context, drawing on material from western societies as well as those in the wider world". Russell's focus is heavily British, with comparisons most effective between England and Scotland: "Scotland differed from England in its dedication to cultural and economic improvements, in its Calvinist ethic and in its University at Edinburgh uniquely tuned to the needs and aspirations of the local and national community." 85 In an examination of the introduction of Western astronomy into China during the seventeenth century by the Jesuit Johann Adam Schall von Bell, Zhu Weizheng analyses Schall's confrontation with the courtier Yang Guangxian; the only element of comparison concerns the two astronomical systems -Western and Chinese. Zhu also writes about Han learning and Western learning in the eighteenth century; where one might have expected a comparison between the European Renaissance and the Han renascence, we see only European writings in China placed alongside the Han classics. 86 The proceedings of the 13 Only by 'differential' studies, whose subject is restricted but which are accurate and varied, concerning different but in some respect comparable situations (this is indeed the original meaning of the term differential: different but very close), can legitimate comparative statements be made. It is with these differences and these similarities as starting point, situated exactly, that appropriate concepts and categories can be formulated to clarify facts, help to understand them in their own reality, and broaden the field of investigation which corresponds to them. 88 But we have seen that scholars addressing science beyond Europe and the United States arrived safely in the harbour of judicious comparison some time ago.
Comparative citation studies, in fact, have been used for more than twenty years, and they continue to inform a growing area of inquiry. 89 R. W. Home and Masao Watanabe, in the late 1980s, compared the development of physics in Australia and Japan during the years before 1950. They observe that differences in the way that the physics discipline came to the two countries "derive not so much from the different cultural settings as from straightforwardly political factors, and in particular, from the fact that Japan remained an independent power while Australia was, throughout this period, a mere subsidiary unit within that vast British Empire upon which the Sun, so it was said, never set". 90 One of the most compelling comparisons is Jaime Larry Benchimol and Luiz Antonio Teixeira's study of the institutes founded by Oswaldo Cruz in Rio de Janeiro and Vital Brazil in Saõ Paulo. Both institutes arose following the outbreak of bubonic plague in the port of Santos in 1899. Their task was to produce serums. By 1911, both institutes presented papers at an international congress in Dresden, "and from this combined effect resulted an increase of international esteem -and as a consequence national esteem -of 'scientific Brazil'". Both institutes competed against faculties of medicine and the Pasteur institutes, which had their own agendas. The institutes also contested with each other for authority in the field of public health. 91 From the standpoint of historians, political scientists may seem to use broad brush strokes. Notwithstanding the use of solid data, impressionistic conflation is the order of the day in comparative science-policy studies, for example Peter S. Biegelbauer's monograph, apparently deriving from a doctoral dissertation at MIT, where Biegelbauer evaluates how Hungary adopted "paradigms" for organizing science from other countries and comments on the experience of other nations in Central Europe. 92 As impressionistic is David Barling's survey of government response in the United States and Europe to genetic modification of foods in a volume that, notwithstanding its subtitle, hardly compares things at all. 93 More compelling is John Connelly's study about higher education in communist Eastern Europe. Connelly examines why "an intelligentsia beholden to the needs of a socialist state" emerged with particular intensity in East Germany, compared to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. ("Why is East Germany like a hot pepper?", my East Berlin host asked me early in the 1980s. "Because it is the smallest, the reddist, and the sharpest.") The Polish communists did not effectively purge old professors in the universities, and the Czech communists, while purging professors, "did not achieve a significant change in the sociocultural make-up of the student body". Neither the Polish nor the Czech communists created loyal élites in the universities. 94 Thomas Glick's model of national conflation is preferred by the political scientist Etel Solingen in her edited collection of eclectic treatments about national and international science; it merits interest here only because several chapters (notably the Soviet Union and Japan) appear by the hand of historians of science. 95 Conflation of separately-developed cases is also the sense of comparison discussed by John M. MacKenzie, an historian of imperial Britain who has addressed themes in colonial science. 96 The attributes of vague comparison have come to buoy to the last of the postmodernist writers, now struggling to hold their head above water. David Turnbull has published a collection of case studies to ascertain "the way knowledge is constructed by different groups of people". His examples are based largely on secondary works and include medieval architects, Polynesian seafarers, and tropical physicians -fields of knowledge that are far, indeed, from the precision and verifiability of the exact sciences. Turnbull's examples are intended to verify his presupposition: "The strength of the sociology of scientific knowledge is its claim to show that what we accept as science and technology could be other than it is." (Presumably his meaning is figurative; he does not explicitly assert that the loading strength of cathedral walls might have defied a modern, mechanical analysis.) Turnbull's chapter on maps inadvertently disproves the contention, for it persuades a reader about the gradual and regular improvement of a picture of the world. The notion of "comparative knowledge traditions" is introduced to relativize, in a way that is not defined, all visions of the natural world:
The most important consequence of the recognition of the localness of scientific knowledge is that it permits a parity in the comparison of the production of contemporary technoscientific knowledges with knowledge production in other cultures. Previously the possibility of a truly equitable comparison was negated by the assumption that indigenous knowledges were merely local and were to be evaluated for the extent to which they had scientific characteristics.... Treating science as local simultaneously puts all knowledge systems on a par and renders vacuous any discussion of their degree of fit with transcendental criteria of scientificity, rationality, and logicality. 97 Little purpose is served in following this chain of scholastic rhetoric. The question is precisely to identify sound and persuasive reasoning, whether the reasoning appear ideological (in the view of Karl Marx) or transcendental (in the view of Paul Forman) to our eyes. 98 Historical comparison continues to be pursued by sociologists. Peter Weingart has compared eugenics in Nazi Germany and democratic Sweden. He finds "a virtual identity of the eugenic and race-hygiene discourse in Sweden and in Germany as well as a striking similarity in the sterilization practice", and he supports the notion that the horror of Nazi eugenics was isolated or "bracketed", in a political way, from essentially comparable disciplines in other countries. Weingart concludes that "the development of science (here eugenics) is hardly directly affected by political circumstances". Rather, politics selects out "certain factions within the scientific community" that "would not survive the scientific debates". 99 Brigitte Chamak has compared the development of the discipline of cognitive science in the United States and in France in a narrative that is less focused than Weingart's. 100 H. C. Bolton and Alan Roberts have measured sentence-length in an attempt to distinguish between scientific and literary styles. 101 The lure of comparison, by means of invoking general principles, appeals to Patrick Carroll, who, notwithstanding his focus on nineteenth-century Ireland, contends that "the modern state, in a crucial sense, is a configuration of subject-bodies and material spaces, realized within a network of heterogeneous practices, in which both government and science and integral". 102 Perhaps we do have science to thank for Margaret Thatcher. * * * Rudyard Kipling's "Ballad of East and West" concerns a Muslim rebel under the British raj who steals the prized horse of a post commander. The commander's son goes out to recover the horse and, through exemplary courage, befriends the thief. The son returns with both the horse and the thief's son, who is instructed to learn the ways of the British invader. In 1931 George Sarton, a contemporary of Kipling's, lectured on "East and West" at Brown University. "Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet", he quoted. Then he generalized Kipling's point about the common quality of courage to emphasize the universal attributes of an apperception of nature:
However divided it may be with regard to material interests and other trifles, mankind is essentially united with regard to its main purpose. East and West are often opposed one to the other, but not necessarily so, and it is wiser to consider them as two visages, or let us say, too moods of the same man.
Sarton continues: "Scientific truth is the same East and West, and so are beauty and charity. Man is the same everywhere with a little more emphasis on this or that." 103 Is science indeed one or many? Is knowledge Platonic or Aristotelian? Shall we in the matter, to use the terms of anthropologists, be etic or emic? 104 The unitary or Platonic view, prominent half a century ago, has been unfashionable recently. George Sarton, just mentioned, saw himself as a Platonist. In his notes for the Keiser Lecture at the Library of Congress, Sarton emphasized:
History of culture should be focussed upon the hist. of science (h. of knowledge). Man different from animals -because of his interest in religion, justice, beauty, truth. Without this -man is nothing but a beast, the most efficient & the most cruel. -Now -history of science is the center -because it is cumulative & progressive. Everything hangs on knowledge, justice & love.
Progress, he notes, did not occur to the ancients; Hesiod, for example, believed that things began with a golden age of perfection, which then regressed into ages of silver, bronze, and iron. The Western notion of progress extended through the Victorian age and into the twentieth century, despite revolutionary discoveries in physics. "In the long run, progress is certain -but our own life is a short run", he commented wistfully. 105 Sarton's view was shared by Joseph Needham, who emphasized, also with Sarton, the significance of the European Scientific Revolution, which forged reliable procedures for discovering new truths about nature. In Needham's view, science was unitary; it could be represented by a great river flowing to the sea, fed by many tributaries. To this end, he identified science writers in Chinese history as counterparts of natural philosophers in the European and Mediterranean traditions, and he dignified particular Chinese endeavours as distinctive scientific disciplines. The course of science, in his view, was a "grand titration". 106 The particularist or Aristotelian view is prominent today, and not only by postmodernist relativists. People who look over the torrent of specialized theses and dissertations issuing from our universities may sense the broad spectrum of norms that govern scientific disciplines: what is half-baked for one specialist may be burned to a crisp for another. In some disciplines, language takes unusual turns, emphasizing passive voice (where experiments conduct themselves) and strange vocabulary (consider, for example, the rise of the word discourse over the past generation, as well as the way titles in English now preferentially begin with an ambiguous gerund instead of the definite article). Disciplines and their norms evolve. Chemical experiments three hundred years ago may seem bizarre today, and what was considered an adequate mathematical proof three hundred years ago may no longer be credible. Today's corpus of chemistry and mathematics departs substantially from what was taught in the eighteenth century.
In her publications on traditional Chinese technologies, Joseph Needham's collaborator Francesca Bray has challenged his ecumenical vision. She writes: "Needham's lyrical accounts of Chinese achievements in science and technology transformed the public image of China and its place in history around the world. Needham criticized using science to bolster Western suprematism, but like the other scientists of his generation he fully shared the teleology of the 'whig position'", the view of an inevitable progress from the past to the present. "Yet precisely what is most interesting about non-Western societies is that the material worlds they produced did not embody the same values as our own." Bray asks for "a new materialism that takes into account social and symbolic as well as -or, where appropriate, instead of -economic and mechanical efficiency". 107 To the extent that Francesca Bray's comments are weakly constructivist and go in the direction of contextualization without challenging causality, to the extent that they give dignity to a wide range of intellectual enterprise, they are situated firmly in the centre of scholarship over the past several generations. 108 My sense is that she wishes to maintain that all views of nature are equally useful, a view that Needham would not have supported. Would such a "new materialism" -freed from the material struggle for survival that dominated Marxist thoughthold that there can be as many kinds of astronomy, metallurgy, and medicine as there are cultures, and that one kind is not better than another? Would such a new materialism advocate that the truth of any apprehension of nature -a judgmental ethnocentrism of Greek science in Antiquity -is a matter of indifference? If so, it would be a materialism extending back more than a century to find antecedents in fin-de-siècle England. In Chapter 2 of "A study in scarlet", by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Watson is amazed at Sherlock Holmes's ignorance of astronomy and tries to relate the nature of the solar system. Holmes becomes annoyed: "'What the deuce is it to me?' he interrupted impatiently: 'You say that we go round the sun. If we went round the moon it would not make a pennyworth of difference to me or to my work.'" Sherlock Holmes shares this indifference with Dante Gabriel Rossetti, a central figure in the anti-modernist artistic and literary movement known as the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, who did not care if the Earth circled the Sun or vice versa. 109 Notwithstanding the considered views of the great master of deductive reasoning and the great champion of sentiment, it seems to me that the radically relativist point of view, just outlined, is incorrect. Since we no longer place credence in astrology, the stars may seem remote and irrelevant, as Sherlock Holmes contends. But consider for a moment the field that is most likely to sustain a relativist thesis, medicine. It is true that before the nineteenth century, with regard to therapeutics, Galenic medicine was hardly superior to the Chinese medicine of acupuncture and moxibustion. Nevertheless, while both traditions of medicine supported the sciences of botany (for materia medica) and chemistry (for concocting cures), European medicine sustained astronomy (for casting horoscopes), and after the Renaissance it slowly embraced descriptive anatomy. With aliquots of post-Baconian science, European medicine was eventually able to intervene in the course of disease in a way unlike that of Chinese medicine; the basis for intervention was statistically verified success. For better or worse, medical practice today owes very little, if anything, to Chinese tradition. (What is the non-Western contribution to a recent, newsworthy medical intervention, the implantation of a cardiac rhythm-management device into a prominent United States politician?) Technology, despite Francesca Bray's relativizing contentions, even more clearly follows one criterion for success, East and West. Nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, the internal combustion engine, synthetic insulin, and microelectronics function in one way, whether in Beijing or Paris; so did, in late medieval times, the magnetic compass, firearms, and the moveable sternpost rudder. 110 Joseph Needham knew that comparison requires a framework of some kind, a standpoint for recognizing similarities and differences. The framework can be rigid and inflexible. In a recent, comparative work, The secret of the West, David Cosandey contends that the secret behind the rise of science and technology in Western Europe is a tradition of competition among stable, independent, and prosperous political entities (a méreuporie) located on a relatively large land mass with a highly articulated coastline. Land wars facilitate competition and encourage the transmission of new technologies. Ready access to the high seas allows for large-scale commerce, on which prosperity and invention depend. The form of the argument recalls scholastic disputes. Africa, for instance, does not enjoy a sufficiently articulated coastline (as calculated by its fractal dimensions according to the author's technique of thalassographie) for sustained innovation in science and technology. When the coastline and other conditions are present and science is absent, a big deficiency is invoked: no science in the Arctic because it is too cold; no science in the eastern part of aboriginal North America because the continent is too vast. In Cosandy's story, merchants are the impetus for, and soldiers the means of, spreading science. 111 The evocation of comparison transcends a mastery of literary tropes. Entirely straightforward prose can achieve a stunning effect by displaying carefully chosen similarities and differences. Generalizations deriving from comparison, even if they prove ephemeral, retain a certain currency. Joseph Ben-David's contrast of centralized French science with free-market German science and George Basalla's stages of colonial science remain useful and fruitful analyses, as does John Theodore Merz's characterization of science in England, France, and Germany. Charles Gillispie has recently reminded us: "One of the mercies of being a historian instead of a practitioner of a more rigorous discipline is that somehow our books turn out to be better than our theories." 112 Historians do continually ask to see new evidence, but give us comparative theses, Lord, if they keep boredom at bay! In contrast to Cosandey's rigid generalizations, G. E. R. Lloyd has collaborated with Nathan Sivin to provide a close and careful reading of Greek and Chinese texts from the period of the 'Greek miracle' and the one hundred schools in the Warring States era in an attempt to characterize the sense of science understood in the West and East. Lloyd cautions that the great diversity of thought in each setting, as well as the incommensurability of many discourses, make comparison extremely difficult:
We cannot start from the Greek side, let us say, by identifying some particularly prominent theory of concept and then asking what the Chinese equivalent isas if it is a foregone conclusion that the will be any such equivalent. We cannot assume, in the period we are dealing with, that there is a single set of theories or concepts fundamental to early science that will turn out to play analogous roles in both China and Greece.
Lloyd finds merit in a revision of the notion that the Greeks were adversarial while the Chinese were irenic, by examining texts outlining their views of nature. Both settings knew schools and discursive traditions, which included a wide range of behaviour. The assertive Greek emphasis on the priority of what we might call 'pure' science, and the argumentative path to achieving certainty in it, in part reflected the relative lack of influence that philosophers exerted over temporal rulers; Chinese savants were more closely tied to political life, and their precepts were designed to intensify the connection. Savants in both settings sought to know causes, but Greek learning was fractious in this search, with schools speaking at cross-purposes, while the savants of the Han period were able to "consolidate a comprehensive world-view". Differences in astronomy follow, although not directly:
The types of astronomical model developed in Greece and China reflect the influence of the styles of intellectual exchange cultivated in each society. The modes of rivalry among astronomers differed, in that, in Greece, the stakes were those of strict proof. The Chinese demand ... was for accuracy in prediction: there was plenty of competitiveness in delivering that. But deductive certainty, incontrovertibility, were a red herring. The enterprise of demonstrating the movements of the planets by way of geometrical models, if it had been attempted -which it was not -would have been considered irrelevant.
Lloyd is convinced that Greek and Chinese science differ from one another, but he is cautious about explaining why:
Not only are there going to be no final explanations of the complex phenomena we refer to under the rubrics of Greek and Chinese philosophy and science: there are not even going to be any hard-edged explanations that are at all comparable to those we would demand in other contexts, for example in explaining physical interactions or even clearly motivated intentional acts in terms of those intentions. The best we can hope for it to identify possible influences, possible correlations or conjunctions, that may enable us to understand how the philosophy and science produced related to the circumstances of their production. It is precisely here that comparative studies can prove so useful, both by highlighting points that might otherwise be missed, and by checking hypotheses as to the interaction of particular factors. Certainly any proposals as to the one-way or mutual influences of some factors on others can be tested by examining whether or not similar combinations of actors cluster elsewhere.
Lloyd is sensitive to charges of relativism. The stars appear for us today just as they did for the ancient Greeks and Chinese; our physical body is not different from theirs. But the view of nature varied:
To be sure, reality is always social constructed in a sense: but that construction reflects the investigators' claims (varied ones, for sure) that it was indeed reality that they were investigating, and that sometimes acts as a check on the investigations, even if sometimes a reality claim is just a persuasive device, and even if no one can step completely outside the conceptual framework within which they operate. 113 He has made a reasonable case for a dialectic between the etic and the emic in natural knowledge. He suggests why we are wise to invoke comparison explicitly, once more, to that end.
Nearly a decade ago, John R. R. Christie surveyed writings in the history of science during the 1970s and 1980s. He observed the decline of "'Big Pictures,' those texts, starting with William Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences (1837), which addressed the whole history of science, or much of it, in Western Civilization". Inspired by a relativist reading of Thomas Kuhn's methodological writings (while apparently ignoring Kuhn's concrete historical research), historians of science focused on the generation of ideas from social settings. Scholars were deterred by the complexity required of any prospective synthesis:
It was not just that increased research from larger numbers of historians made the coverage of science in history much more demanding. Even more demanding were the methodological imperatives: to be one's own social, political, economic, intellectual historian in addition would have been a dismaying methodological prospect for any but the supernaturally gifted historian of science, if a "Big Picture" for social history of science, comparable to the older synthetic works of 1837-1960, were to be contemplated.
In place of the intelligible narrative came the relativist notion that scientific texts were at base nothing more than social interactions: understanding knowledge past became an exercise in revealing who had "power" over whom, and the exercise focused on "concrete, localized and relativized knowledge". Christie hoped to see a rise of interest in instruments, instrumentation, and physical human agency: "Scientists always were and are bodies, bodies whose agency of variegated disciplinary skills were always essential to the performance of science." He looked forward to the year 2001 for answers to many of the questions he posed. 114 The present focus departs substantially from Christie's assessment. The range and accomplishment of comparative writing over the past generation is encouraging. "Big Picture" research is certainly alive and well. The best parts of comparative writing in the discipline of history of science proceed carefully and systematically, drawing upon results obtained by other specialists. Comparative research has shown that, in the evolution of natural knowledge, scientific disciplines (however one is to refer to kinds of knowledge like astronomy, algebra, or medicine) have greater or lesser discursive cohesion and appear to respond to broader social settings in special ways (some disciplines have little in common across space and time, while others remain surprisingly invariant). Whatever else may be said about comparative research, it has generated unusual enthusiasm among its practitioners. The results, where dogma and cant occupy a relatively small place, have found wide appeal. In its many forms, comparison offers a promising way of tracking around the convoluted cataracts of recent methodological discussions. 
